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1 RESEARCH PROBLEM
When looking at multi-agent systems (MAS), we can
define them as a collection of agents, physical or vir-
tual, which have shared responsibilities within the do-
main they are working within. These systems have
the potential to be utilised in a myriad of different
settings, such as defence, industry, agricultural, and
more (Fan et al., 2011). These systems can be com-
posed of a range of different agents, from complex
heterogeneous robotic teams (Rizk et al., 2019) to ho-
mogeneous ariel drones (Yasin et al., 2020), the diver-
sity of the construction of these systems allows them
to be used in a wide range of problem domains.
There is a clear advantage to using these systems
over their single-agent counterparts, one of these be-
ing their ability to scale to complex problem domains,
in which, single agents would be inefficient within, in
several ways. When viewing these systems from a
safety engineering standpoint, they have great poten-
tial within safety-critical domains, and with complex
agents being used within these systems, even have the
ability to replace humans, who otherwise would have
to be put in a position of risk to carry out jobs.
There are examples of these systems within
safety-critical domains, such as within search and res-
cue operations(Gregory et al., 2016), and within situ-
ations that see agents within irradiated places. It has
been seen during the disaster at the Fukushima nu-
clear power plant that these systems have been used
for this exact purpose cite (Schwager et al., 2017)
However, with added functionality brings added
complexity to the systems themselves, and the be-
haviours that they can exhibit as a system. This added
complexity, within complex domains, can be incred-
ibly time consuming and complicated for program-
mers to work with, causing issues with performance
and reliability. Therefore, a substantial research area
has emerged which focuses upon the pairing of MAS
with a machine learning technique known as rein-
forcement learning (RL), to allow systems to learn to
work together efficiently (Boutilier, 1996).
RL is a promising technique which enables agents
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to learn how to achieve system objectives effi-
ciently (Patel et al., 2011), specifically within se-
quential decision-making problems. Agents with no
knowledge of the problem environment will use a
mixture of exploration (choosing an action at ran-
dom), and exploitation (choosing the action with
the largest reward), to find state action pairings that
amount to an optimal policy. An optimal policy is
the groupings of state-action pairs that maximise a re-
ward.
There are many works which focus upon MAS
and RL, otherwise known as multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning (MARL). These works discuss the ben-
efits of MARL, such as efficiency, and robustness
through the division of labour. While also detailing
the challenges, such as ensuring reliable communi-
cations, and increased complexity (Buşoniu et al.,
2010).
MARL has been proposed to be a solution to a
wide range of problems; this includes being used
within the inspection of nuclear power plant (Bogue,
2011), and other hazardous environments, removing
the need for humans. One large deterrent in the prac-
tical use of MARL in safety-critical scenarios is due
to the inherent nature of RL and MARL, which is
stochastic. There will be hazards within any prob-
lem domain that is classed as safety-critical, and these
hazards must be given the highest of attention, failing
to do so could lead to damage being sustained to hu-
mans, valuable resources, or the system itself.
This lack of concern for hazards is a continued
issue with traditional RL, as guarantees of the learn-
ing agent needlessly performing risky behaviours are
not provided. This concern comes from the fact that
RL is used to maximise a reward function, and of-
ten safety concerns will be counter-productive to this
aim, meaning they will not be considered (Garcia and
Fernández, 2012). The lack of consideration dramat-
ically limits the potential for these systems to be used
in practical applications, as without guarantees of the
agent avoiding needlessly risky actions, they can po-
tentially cause harm. Merely trying to mitigate this
issue by attempting to capture the safety concerns
within a reward function is not sufficient, it is not pos-
sible to capture such complex safety demands within
a simple numerical reward function.
This problem has been addressed in multiple
pieces of work. However, minus recent work by (Ma-
son et al., 2017), there are very limited comprehen-
sive solutions to the problem (Garcia and Fernández,
2012), often these solutions involve completely re-
moving behaviours from the agents that can lead to
risk, in a safety-critical environment, this could be
highly counter-productive. These largely theoretical
solutions also have scalability issues, are unable to
express non-trivial safety properties, and do not fully
satisfy the objective of securing guarantees that cer-
tain requirements will be met.
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, there are
even fewer pieces of work focusing on a general,
non-problem-specific method of guaranteeing safety
properties are met. Often this work focuses on spe-
cific aspects of safety, or problems, such as col-
lision avoidance (Wang et al., 2016), autonomous
cars (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016a), or does not sat-
isfy this project’s desired outcomes. Meaning at the
time of writing there is not a comprehensive approach
to safe MARL, as has been introduced to safe RL.
This project, influenced by recent works in safe
single-agent RL (Mason et al., 2017), aims to produce
an approach to safe MARL, which will provide solu-
tions which are guaranteed to meet a myriad of safety
requirements, while learned producing behaviour that
adequately meets the functional requirements of the
problem.
2 OUTLINE OF OBJECTIVES
The use of MARL within safety-critical environ-
ments, and safe MARL, has several issues with its
current state. The first of these include a lack of ap-
proaches that can be applied to a broad range of sys-
tems and domains, many papers which could be de-
fined as perusing safe MARL, focus on specific is-
sues, domains, or agent types. The second issue is
a lack of ability to describe non-trivial safety require-
ments to the MARL system accurately; it is not possi-
ble to describe complex requirement within a reward
function, which is commonly used within MARL.
The third issue involves the lack of guarantees which
can be currently made about successfully following
safety requirements, while the system learns to reach
the functional requirements of the domain.
This project aims to mitigate these issues by intro-
ducing an approach which is depicted in figure one.
This approach offers a solution to these issues by in-
troducing a multi-step, interchangeable method for
producing assured MARL policies. The main objec-
tives which this approach are as follows.
1. Assured MARL should be applicable to a broad
range of problems, domains, and systems, allow-
ing users to follow the steps of the approach while
altering the tools and techniques used freely, with-
out compromising the integrity of the approach.
2. Assured MARL should be capable of allowing
domain experts to express and implement a myr-
iad of non-trivial safety and functional require-
ments to guide the MARL system.
3. Lastly, assured MARL should produce guaran-
tees that the safety requirements will not be vi-
olated, while still allowing the MAS to complete
the functional requirements efficiently, in regard
to the constraints set by the safety requirements.
The aforementioned approach is shown in figure
one; it is comprised of three main stages. The first
stage all unneeded information is abstracted away
from the problem in the form of an abstract Markov
decision process (AMPD). This is done to ensure that
the model is small enough for effective QV by ab-
stracting out all unneeded information a model which
is small enough for effective and efficient QV whilst
retaining sufficient knowledge for meaningful poli-
cies can be obtained. The abstraction of MDPs is a
well-known approach and is well established within
safety engineering for reducing problems complex-
ity (Cizelj et al., 2011).
In order for this stage to be done effectively,
all properties which inform on the agents’ safety
and functional requirements must be included in the
model, for example, states, actions or events, rewards,
or costs. It is also necessary for this stage for the
domain expert to define the safety and functional
constraints which are desired to be met. This can
be done with relative flexibility with the constraints
being defined with probabilistic computational tree
logic (PCTL) (Ciesinski and Größer, 2004).
PCTL, as the name suggests, is a temporal logic
and can be used to express functional and safety spec-
ifications which need to be met as concise formulae.
The second stage involves analysing the AMDP
that was obtained in step one using QV. Using a
model checker such as PRISM, the domain expert can
describe the AMDP in a state-based language (Parker
and Norman, 2014). The QV tool will be able to ver-
ify the AMDP and make guarantees based on func-
tional and safety constraints we defined previously.
If the AMDP has been described correctly, the QV
tool will synthesis a policy or multiple policies, that
will govern the MARL in the domain.
It may be necessary to return to stage one, if a pol-
icy cannot be found, as the description of the problem
Figure 1: The three stages of our assured MARL approach
or the abstraction of the MDP may have contained
flaws. It is also important to note if the AMDP is in-
sufficient the guarantees made by the QV tool may
not hold. It is vital, therefore that the problem is ab-
stracted appropriately.
This ability to derive policies for which guaran-
tees are possible is significantly different to other
forms of RL and MARL, and also most other forms
of safe RL, minus (Mason et al., 2017), a paper for
safe single-agent RL, by which this project is largely
influenced.
The final part of this approach sees the policy,
which was synthesised in stage two, implemented
into the actual domain problem in the form of be-
haviour constraints and task partitions, disallowing
agents from performing needlessly risky actions.
The agents will learn within their partitioned task
spaces, overlapping with each other when the respon-
sibility of tasks should be shared and will be unable
to enter risky situations unnecessarily.
Learning under these constraints will allow the
agents to enter into risky situations, but with the use
of QV, it is guaranteed that this risk will be bounded.
This learning stage does not aim for optimality as it
is common in safety engineering for the optimal strat-
egy to be removed due to added constraints. This ap-
proach, however, does guarantee a degree of safety
while also, in many cases, increasing the speed of
learning.
3 STATE OF THE ART
3.1 Preliminaries
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a branch of machine
learning that allows an agent to learn which action to
choose in relation to the current state it is within. The
premise of RL is the use of past experiences to influ-
ence an agent’s behaviour within the future. As the
agent moves around the problem space, it will receive
numerical rewards based on the effectiveness of the
action it has taken.
Domains which house these problems which RL
aims to solve are described as the well established
Markov Decision Process. The problem is broken
down into states and actions that are available within
those states. As the agent makes its way through
the domain, it may choose between using an action
known to be beneficial (exploitation) and those ac-
tions about which little is known (exploration).
When an agent takes action in a state, depending
on the effectiveness of this action towards the end
goal, the agent will receive a reward or punishment
which will be associated with the state action pair
Q : (s,a)→ R. A widespread algorithm used to find
the optimal value for these state action pairs is known
as Q-learning (Patel et al., 2011).
This agent will continue to learn in this way until
it has created a policy which will satisfy the objec-
tive, and if left to learn for long enough, will find the
optimal policy.
A policy, in the case of RL, is a mapping of ac-
tion to states with the most efficient mapping of these
actions and states being known as an optimal pol-
icy. Traditional RL algorithms, such as QL, are solely
concerned with finding the optimal policy within a
problem. However, due to this, the traditional RL is
not adequately equipped for safety constraints, and
therefore, the optimal policy may not be safe.
Multi-agent reinforcement learning, an extension
of RL, is an area of research which focuses on multi-
ple agents working together within a system. These
systems will learn to solve problems together in a
shared environment (Boutilier, 1996). As with RL,
MARL has an expansive amount of literature detail-
ing the challenges and the benefits that they can of-
fer (Buşoniu et al., 2010). Some of these benefits,
which is driving the research to be able to use these
systems practically and safely, include robustness,
division of labour, and efficiency. However, with
these benefits come the issues of increased complex-
ity, which is why this project includes an abstraction
stage, as well as issues with ensuring reliable com-
munication. There are three main types of algorithms
which have been created for MARL, and these are
as follows, independent learners, joint action learn-
ers, and gradient-descent algorithms (Buşoniu et al.,
2010; Bloembergen et al., 2015).
3.2 Safe RL
The majority of approaches found within single-
agent safe RL revolve around several types of ap-
proach depending on whether they are focus on ex-
ploration or optimisation features of learning (Gar-
cia and Fernández, 2015). Many of these approaches
which are relevant to the approach’s aims fall under
optimisation focus. Here many pieces of work have
pushed towards the tailoring of reward functions, and
also the restriction or manipulation of the rewards re-
ceived (Serrano-Cuevas et al., 2019; Kroening et al.,
2020).
Within the optimisation focus, there are three
main areas of research, these being, worst-case cri-
terion, risk-sensitive criterion, and constrained cri-
terion (Garcia and Fernández, 2015). The types
of works that tailor reward functions, as mentioned
above often fall into the scope of worst-case crite-
rion, and risk-sensitive criterion, however, the most
promising work which complements the aims of the
approach that this project proposes, falls into the con-
strained criterion.
The constrained criterion approaches are based on
the premise of constraints being places on which be-
haviours and agent can act out, and which ones they
may not, this can be seen being utilised in (Moldovan,
2012), to avoid irreversible actions, amongst others
(Moldovan, 2012; Biyik et al., 2019). One piece of
work introduced a novel approach to the constrained
approach, this being the approach completed in (Ma-
son et al., 2017), known as Assured RL.
The combination of a QV stage to the RL pro-
cesses made by (Mason et al., 2017)introduced a
multi-step approach to safe RL, allowing the verifi-
cation of requirements to a single-agent domain. This
work produced highly promising results and validated
the research direction of creating approaches based on
this premise to new areas.
3.3 Safe MARL
The research area of safe MARL appears less directed
than that of safe RL, but certain trends can be found
to have formed. When looking at recent advance-
ments within safe MARL, there is a clear focus to-
wards anti-collision of MARL systems, which is war-
ranted given the nature of MAS (Zhang et al., 2019;
Cheng et al., 2020; Khan et al., 2019). Also, there
is a focus upon automated vehicles, as a large push
in a research effort that could open many changes
to the world (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016b), among
some other domains, most notably traffic based do-
mains (Rasheed et al., 2020; Guo, 2020; Lemos et al.,
2018). However, much like Safe RL until recently,
this work has been focused on specific domains prob-
lems, and specific techniques, such as specific al-
gorithmic approaches, which may be restricting in
broader use. It should also be noted that the reinforce-
ment learning technique, known as deep learning, has
become a large focus within this research area.
4 METHODOLOGY
In order to achieve the objectives of this project, we
must progress through the steps which are listed be-
low.
1. To begin with relevant literature must be explored,
primarily around the research areas of safe RL,
safe MARL, and MARL. In this way we can lo-
cate the limitations that are currently troubling the
progression of MARL being used within safety-
critical scenarios. With this knowledge we can
more accurately determine the direction that our
research and approach will take.
2. It is then possible for us to develop a theoretical
approach to mitigating these limitations, and see
how this approach compares to the current litera-
ture.
3. We can then begin developing a practical ap-
proach to solve the limitations based in a theo-
retical design, the two changing as needed based
on practical limitations.
4. Evaluate our approach in two vastly different case
studies, making use of unconstrained RL as a
benchmark for our constrained RL produced by
our approach. Our focus within the evaluation
stages will be primarily on the safety require-
ments and how each type of RL manages to deal
with the problem space in regards to them, while
still being able to complete the functional require-
ments.
5. Extend the scope of the approach by including
advanced RL techniques, such as deep learning
and evaluating how well the approach can scale
to this.
6. Increasingly test the scalability of our approach,
with different system sizes, more complex do-
mains.
The approach will be evaluated using two do-
mains created within simulators. The first of these
is a patrolling simulator which allows many agents
to navigate around problem spaces (Portugal et al.,
2019). This ROS simulator, with the addition of
RL strategies will allow us to evaluate our approach
in a popular MAS problem with traditional RL.
The second simulator is a physics simulator which
is very widely used within the Deep RL commu-
nity (Todorov et al., 2012). Here a case study will be
extended to allow the approach to be used as a safety
domain for Safe Deep RL.
The QV section of the approach will be dealt with
using the model checker known as PRISM (Parker
and Norman, 2014). This model checker supports
the verification of reward-extended PCTL properties
which can be used for the purposes of the proposed
approach. PRISM has been used in previous works
involving unmanned agents (Calinescu et al., 2017;
Gerasimou et al., 2017; Gerasimou et al., 2018), and
should be more than capable of being used within the
proposed approach.
5 EXPECTED OUTCOME
The expected outcome of the project is to produce an
assured MARL approach that will enable multiple re-
inforcement learning agents to navigate a plethora of
domains, and problems, while complying to a myriad
of safety requirements. This approach will introduce
the ability to both express and satisfy diverse, com-
plex, and sometimes conflicting safety requirements
to MARL systems that can then reliably learn to meet
functional requirements to an acceptable level of effi-
ciency.
Our approach guarantees that safety requirements
will be satisfied by making use of QV. This guarantee
comes from the constraints placed onto the system,
which are verified with QV to ensure the system will
meet safety requirements without removing the abil-
ity to meet functional requirements.
As mentioned previously, this approach is in-
tended to be used across many domains, but also with
different system sizes, different RL algorithms, and
in varying domain complexity.
In order for the approach to be capable of this,
there are key prerequisites that must be supplied by
the domain expert before learning can begin, these
being the safety and functional requirements which
will be expressed within PCTL, and also a high-level
abstract model of the problem domain. The nature of
these prerequisites supports flexibility in the safety re-
quirements expressed, as well as the problem domain,
as they can be crafted to the needs of the domain.
To this end, it is expected that the system’s agents
will be restricted in what actions they can and can-
not perform within certain states of the system, while
they are learning, and after learning is completed. It
is also likely, by the nature of the domain space, and
MAS, that states within the domain will be divided
between agents within the system, potentially reduc-
ing the search space for each agent.
Agents learning within these constraints are guar-
anteed not to violate the safety requirements while
also learning the optimal policy to solving the prob-
lem, the definition of optimal, in this case, being sub-
jected to the effect the constraints have on the prob-
lem domain.
This approach will contribute largely to safe
MARL, offering a way to express and satisfy complex
and sometimes conflicting safety constraints, while
still completing functional requirements with an ac-
ceptable level of efficiency.
6 STAGE OF THE RESEARCH
At this stage steps (1-3) have been completed, with
substantial progress made in step (4), the approach
has been implemented and successfully evaluated on
one domain, showing promising initial results, these
results, as well as the work, achieved so far can be
found in (Riley et al., 2020). The aim which is be-
ing worked towards at the time of writing is expand-
ing the approach to a separate domain, and poten-
tially showcasing the approach using deep learning
techniques to bridge the gap to the current projection
within MARL research, which is heavily influenced
by deep learning.
6.1 Completed Work
In order to evaluate the approach that has been pre-
sented, a domain has been created that tackles an
issue that has been the focus of a number of pa-
Figure 2: Nuclear reactor map within the simulator, over-
laid with states and possible routes.
pers (Bogue, 2011). This domain is a robotic team
working within a nuclear power plant. Two robots
must learn to navigate the nuclear power plant, pa-
trolling each main area, as shown in Figure 2, which
is a view of the ROS simulator which this domain is
housed within, with red lines showing the actions the
robots have available to them between rooms.
The robots must meet the following constraints:
• C1: Visit each room a minimum of three times
• C2: Complete all tasks without exhausting their
batteries
Looking at these constraints, we can see that C1,
is a functional requirement of visiting each room in
the power plant three times. In comparison, C2 can be
seen as a safety requirement, as the robots using too
much of their batteries could lead to a human having
to come into the hazardous domain to collect them. At
the same time, C2 can be seen as a functional require-
ment, to finish the patrol with the maximum amount
of battery remaining. In our example, each action has
a corresponding battery cost.
The part of this domain which makes which cate-
gorises it as a hazardous domain is the room labelled
with the number 4. We suggest that this room is
highly irradiated, and while this room should be vis-
ited three times, the amount of time that the robots
spend within this room should be minimised. There-
fore, an additional safety constraint can be added as
C3:
• C3: The amount of time spent in room 4 should
be minimised
Radiation is a serious safety hazard, that can be detri-
mental to robotic agents, and human agents alike,
given our domain, minimising radiation exposure is
a natural safety constraint.
As previously stated, each action has a corre-
sponding value; for example, if a robot were in room
three, it would have six available actions available to
it. These all being movements to the other rooms via
Table 1: Options for entering and leaving room 4 and the
corresponding risk of damage.
Entrance Exit Exposure Time Risk
Hallway A Hallway A 30 (seconds) 0.03
Hallway A Hallway D 34 (seconds) 0.04
Hallway D Hallway D 46 (seconds) 0.07
Hallway D Hallway A 34 (seconds) 0.04
different paths. These paths will be more or less en-
ergy efficient based on the distance of travel.
As previously stated, room four has risk associ-
ated with it in the form of radiation exposure. The
risk associated with these actions relates to the time
the robots will spend within the room according to
the distance of the path chosen. This is shown in Ta-
ble 1 and along with the battery costs, were created as
reward structures within the PRISM language.
This domain was abstracted into an AMDP, which
is common practice within safety engineering, as
stated previously. From this abstraction, the rooms,
movement actions between rooms, battery usage, and
information on risk was left untouched, while every-
thing else was removed from the model.
The functional constraints, C1 and C2 and safety
constraints C3 were formally expressed using PCTL
and were then used to verify the abstracted MDP us-
ing the probabilistic model checker known as PRISM.
After running QV on the AMDP expressed within
PRISM, a single policy was synthesised that satisfied
both the functional and safety constraints.
This policy was then used to constrain the MAS
within the constructed domain, with tasks divided be-
tween the agents within the system based on this pol-
icy, with the two agents sharing the responsibility of
two rooms, and having two rooms each which they
are solely responsible. As well as actions being con-
strained, which stopped the agents needlessly moving
around the domain, actions were also constrained ac-
cording to the policy which caused the agents to need-
lessly enter into the hazardous area.
The evaluation experiments that were run within
this domain were very promising, with the assured
MARL constrained approach satisfying all of the con-
straints, with significantly less battery usage than
the experiments run without the assured MARL ap-
proach, and in significantly fewer learning episodes.
6.2 Ongoing Work
Work which is presently being undertaken is the con-
tinued adaption of the approach to a different domain
problem with greater complexity. This will be tak-
ing place within the physics engine known as Mu-
joco (Todorov et al., 2012). This will likely take the
form of a domain which will be ideal for deep learn-
ing, fulfilling steps (4 and5). This will allow extensive
evaluation of the approach, adding to the validity of
all of the objectives which this project aims to com-
plete.
6.3 Future Work
Future work will involve more extensive experimen-
tation of the approach under different circumstances.
This will be an ideal way to test how well the ap-
proach scales, to different domain sizes and complex-
ity, different system sizes, and learning techniques.
These additional experiments will be able to deter-
mine to what extend objective one has been achieved.
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